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LEARNING THE HARD WAY
Force Protection 1983–2000
Lieutenant Commander John Callaway, U.S. Navy
Since the attack on Khobar Towers in June 1996, the Department of
Defense (DoD) has made significant improvements in protecting its ser-
vice members, mainly in deterring, disrupting and mitigating terrorist
attacks on installations. The attack on USS Cole (DDG 67), in the port
of Aden, Yemen, on 12 October 2000, demonstrated a seam in the fabric
of efforts to protect our forces, namely in-transit forces.
USS COLE COMMISSION REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The October 2000 terrorist attack on the guided-missile destroyer USS Cole(DDG 67) in the port of Aden, Yemen, is commonly viewed in the larger
context of al-Qa‘ida’s September 11th campaign. Beyond the initial official in-
vestigations, the military force-protection context of the attack has largely been
overlooked as analysts have traced the movements of al-Qa‘ida operatives who
were traversing the globe at the time. But the proper context of the Cole bomb-
ing is a series of terrorist attacks against U.S. military forces abroad that started
in 1983.
The 1983 Beirut bombings, the Khobar Towers attack in 1996, and the Cole
attack in 2000 have striking similarities, though their perpetrators were differ-
ent. A comparison of these three cases highlights three trends concerning orga-
nizational learning in the military about force protection: organizational change
(command and control), intelligence support, and
recognition of the threat. This article assesses, on the
basis of the investigations conducted after the attacks,
what the military has learned about force protection,
and how well.1
These three cases are illuminating with respect to
casualties suffered and lessons learned. They also illus-
trate the military’s organizational change over time
with respect to the three underlying themes. By the late
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1990s (see figure 1), the military had acknowledged that command-and-control
structures were inadequate in the Beirut barracks and Khobar Towers bombings
and had begun to address them formally. Second, it had learned that while rele-
vant intelligence was collected, analyzed, and disseminated, warnings went un-
heeded in both earlier cases. Third, the military’s understanding of the terrorist
threat was by that time evolving from the relative ignorance of the 1980s to dim
recognition. More generally, and as depicted in figure 2, the 1996 Khobar Towers
bombing represented a “failure to learn” from the 1983 Beirut barracks attack.2
The 2000 Cole bombing, in contrast, was a “failure to anticipate” the next attack
despite having learned the lessons of Beirut.
April 2008 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the 1983 bombing of the
American embassy in Beirut, Lebanon. The embassy was destroyed by a car
bomb in that attack, and sixty-one people were killed.3 The embassy’s vulnera-
bility in the April attack pointed to the vulnerability of U.S. military forces in
Lebanon. Indeed, the 1983 terrorist bombing that most people remember is the
attack on the U.S. Marine barracks at the Beirut International Airport in Octo-
ber. A battalion of Marines was ashore on a peacekeeping mission. Two hundred
twenty of its Marines plus another twenty-one military personnel were killed by
a truck bomb that exploded with the force of twelve thousand pounds of TNT.
The October attack exposed severe problems in command and control, spe-
cifically the lack of authority of the regional commander in chief (as today’s
combatant commanders were then known) over the Marines on the ground. It
also revealed micromanagement by Washington of military actions in Lebanon
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FIGURE 1
MILITARY LEARNING AFTER THE 1983 AND 1996 ATTACKS
a. “Intelligence failure” is defined as “systematic organizational surprise resulting from incorrect, missing, discarded, or
inadequate hypotheses.” Robert Johnston, Analytic Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community (Washington, D.C.: Cen-
ter for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2005), p. 6.
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through a bloated chain of command that stretched from the Pentagon to the
field.4 These faults contributed to the impetus for the Goldwater-Nichols De-
fense Reorganization Act of 1986.5
The investigations that followed the 1983 attacks also raised questions about
the effectiveness of intelligence. At the strategic level, the terrorist threat had al-
ready been widely understood, and the bombing of the embassy in April clearly
had indicated its seriousness. The next month, five months before the attack on
the barracks, a team surveyed intelligence support for the Marine peacekeepers
at the tactical level. It reported that much intelligence was available but that
there were problems in coordination of reporting and analysis.6 No action was
taken on the report.
Between the survey in May and the October bombing, attacks on the Marine
peacekeepers escalated from sniping to heavy rockets and artillery; the Marines
received “over 100 intelligence reports warning of terrorist car bomb attacks.”7
Yet still no action was taken on the survey’s recommendations. After the attack,
the Director of Naval Intelligence reviewed the intelligence data available before
the bombing and concluded, “The chances were pretty good we would have
been able to predict [the attack].”8 Tactically, intelligence had been available but
not had not been prioritized or tailored to support force protection.
The official Department of Defense investigation of the attack, known as
the Long Commission, identified a lack of antiterrorist human intelligence
(HUMINT) as contributing to the vulnerability of the Marines. Specific
threats, though received in high volume, “seldom materialized.”9 Additional
human-intelligence capability was needed to prioritize and determine the
credibility of those threats and then exploit any leads developed in the network
of sources. This type of fully integrated intelligence plan provides command-
ers on the ground a clearer picture of what they can actually expect.
The Long Commission also specifically investigated “terrorism as a mode of
warfare.”10 In 1983, terrorism was not considered a form of warfare, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms did not (per Locher)
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MILITARY FAILURES IN TERRORISM
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define it. In fact, the cause initially listed for those killed in the bombing was “ac-
cidental death.”11 The commission argued, however, that “the systematic, care-
fully orchestrated terrorism which we see in the Middle East today represents a
new dimension of warfare.” Whatever the formal definition, however, a senior
European Command officer commented that commanders on the ground in
Lebanon “neglect[ed] their responsibility for security of their personnel in
high-threat areas, against repeated, proven attack capabilities.”12
In November 1995, terrorists bombed the office of a State Department–run pro-
gram in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, killing five American military personnel. In a re-
markable parallel to the Beirut attacks, seven months later the terrorists struck
again in the same country, with greater force and against a military target. This
time terrorists struck Khobar Towers, a U.S. Air Force barracks in Dhahran. The
facility housed American and allied personnel supporting Operation SOUTHERN
WATCH, the coalition enforcement of the no-fly zone then established over
southern Iraq. This attack, delivered by a truck bomb on 25 June 1996, killed
nineteen airmen and wounded approximately five hundred.13
The Khobar Towers bombing, thirteen years after the Beirut attack and
nearly ten after passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, again shocked the U.S.
military. Goldwater-Nichols had given regional combatant commanders au-
thority to match their responsibility to forces in the field. However, their staffs
had still lacked an organizational focus on terrorism. Therefore, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff created an office, known as J-34, to deal with antiterrorist and
force-protection matters, and corresponding offices took shape at the lower
echelons of command.14
In the Khobar Towers case intelligence information had once again been
available, if not specific. The Downing Assessment Task Force was created to in-
vestigate the attack. Its Finding 7 states, “Intelligence provided warning of the
terrorist threat to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia.” Senator Arlen Specter, chairman
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, declared after his committee
conducted its own investigation, “There was no failure of intelligence, but a fail-
ure to use intelligence.”15 However, the Downing assessment did lament the lack
of HUMINT capability: “Human intelligence . . . is probably the only source of
information that can provide tactical details of a terrorist attack. The U.S. intelli-
gence community must have the requisite authorities and invest more time,
people, and funds into developing HUMINT against the terrorist threat.”16
In marked contrast to conventional wisdom at the time of the Beirut bomb-
ing and even to the tentative language of the Long Commission, the Downing
task force asserted flatly that “terrorism . . . is a form of warfare.”17 Indeed, the
first opinion expressed in the Downing assessment articulated a new
1 1 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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understanding of the terrorist threat, declaring terrorism to be “AN UNDE-
CLARED WAR ON THE UNITED STATES.”18 The Downing task force also recom-
mended command-and-control changes and identified intelligence lessons.
Some of the lessons repeated the Long Commission’s findings. Some lessons
were new. But some lessons were still to come.
USS COLE
On 10 October 2000, Cole transited the Suez Canal en route to the Persian Gulf,
where the ship was to enforce the United Nations sanctions against Iraq and
keep its Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles ready for possible use by the
Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). On 11 October 2000 Cole
passed southward through the Red Sea at twenty-seven knots. The next day, the
12th, the ship entered Aden and tied up alongside a dolphin, a pierlike structure
of concrete pilings in the middle of the harbor, to take on fuel. As is customary
when a ship visits a port, numerous small vessels soon approached it. Two tugs
maneuvered the ship along the dolphin, assisted by two smaller boats carrying
line handlers, who would pull the mooring lines to the dolphin’s cleats and make
them fast. The harbor pilot, when his task was complete, disembarked into a pi-
lot boat, and the husbanding agent, a representative of the company arranging
for fuel and other services, boarded from (probably) yet another boat. Several
small scows came to take trash, as well as sewage pumped from the ship’s holding
tanks.
Less than two hours after Cole’s arrival, another small craft approached the
warship from the pier area across the harbor. One man was in the stern, handling
the outboard motor, and a second was standing in the bow. The skiff turned to-
ward the center of the warship, the man in the bow waving to the crew topside,
and a moment later an explosion rocked the harbor. An explosive charge ripped
a forty-by-forty-five-foot hole through the steel skin of the ship, killing seven-
teen sailors and wounding forty-two others.19
The attack was actually a second attempt. Earlier that year, on 3 January, USS
The Sullivans (DDG 68), another guided-missile destroyer, had entered Aden Har-
bor to refuel. As it stood in, al-Qa‘ida operatives launched a small boat into the
water from a trailer. The boat, overloaded with explosives, sank to the bottom al-
most immediately.20 The failed attack escaped the notice of the U.S. intelligence
community and, apparently, of the Yemeni government.21 The boat and the explo-
sives were later recovered and reassembled for use against another target of oppor-
tunity, which turned out to be Cole.22
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Command and Control
Investigations into the Cole bombing revealed three main areas of concern with
respect to command and control. Ambiguity in the chain of command at the
time of the Beirut bombing had been resolved, but the attack on Cole exposed a
“seam” that came into play when forces transferred from one combatant com-
mander to another. Second, the staff structure to support antiterrorism and
force protection that had been created after Khobar Towers now proved weak
and inefficient. Finally, the investigations found fault with the engagement
strategy that had brought Cole to Yemen in the first place.
U.S. military forces are generally manned, equipped, and trained in the conti-
nental United States and then deployed forward to meet the requirements of re-
gional combatant commanders. The Goldwater-Nichols Act strengthened the
authority of the combatant commanders in their respective regions, but it did
not enforce uniformity of practice and procedure. Therefore, when a ship, as
Cole did, left the European Command area of responsibility to enter
CENTCOM’s, its entire operational chain of command changed at the desig-
nated moment of transfer. This is significant because the changes included oper-
ating procedures, reporting processes, and administrative requirements, as well
as the authorities who monitored them. This change occurred for Cole on 9 Oc-
tober, three days before the attack. Cole was no different in this respect from doz-
ens of other ships passing into the Persian Gulf, but this “seam,” the magnitude
and abruptness of the adjustments required of the ship and the lack of opportu-
nity for the new commander to confirm them, likely made it easier for al-Qa‘ida
to surprise a newly arrived target of opportunity.
Specifically, the change of operational control to CENTCOM gave Cole a new
immediate superior—Commander, Task Force 50 (CTF 50), the Abraham Lin-
coln carrier battle group commander. CTF 50 assumed responsibility for, in ad-
dition to all other aspects of the ship’s employment and logistics, Cole’s
protection. The task force commander had designated an assistant to his staff in-
telligence officer as staff force-protection officer. One investigation of the subse-
quent attack was to criticize CTF 50’s lack of oversight of Cole. Specifically,
obvious administrative errors in the Cole’s own force-protection plan had not
been corrected, and, more important, the plan had not been tailored to address
the specific conditions of Aden Harbor—notably, the existence of the fueling
dolphin.
Lastly, the reports of the Defense Department’s Cole Commission (known as
the Crouch-Gehman Report) and the House Armed Service Committee investi-
gation would both question the appropriateness of Yemen as a place for fueling
American warships. The choice of Yemen was a primary focus during the Senate
1 1 2 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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Armed Services Committee hearings as well. The chairman, Senator John Warner,
pointedly asked, “The one question all of us keep hearing . . . [is] why Yemen?”23
The answer was that in 1997 the Yemenis had approached the State Depart-
ment and Department of Defense hoping to improve relations with the United
States. The Navy generally refueled warships at sea, steaming in groups. How-
ever, single-ship transits were becoming more common as the post–Cold War
force structure began to draw down and as post–Gulf War requirements led
Central Command to call for ships one or two at a time to enforce sanctions,
their Tomahawk missiles ready. Until 1997 Djibouti had been the primary refu-
eling stop for ships transiting from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf. However,
conditions there were becoming increasingly unsatisfactory. In 1998, given Ye-
meni interest, the deteriorating situation in Djibouti, and the lack of alternative
ports, the Navy concluded a bunkering (fueling) contract with the port facility
at Aden.
General Anthony Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps, who was the CENTCOM com-
mander at the time, and his subordinate Vice Admiral Charles W. Moore, com-
mander of the Fifth Fleet, both visited Aden to see the fueling facilities at first
hand. A security survey, called a “vulnerability assessment,” was then conducted.
Between September 1997 and December 2000, twenty-nine U.S. Navy ships vis-
ited Aden Harbor. Twenty-six of the twenty-nine calls were brief stops for fuel.
Yemen was known to be a dangerous place, but the configuration of Aden’s
harbor, including the fact that ships would fuel at a dolphin in the middle of the
harbor, seemed to mitigate security concerns. Normally, refueling ships moor to
a pier and take fuel by hoses from “risers” installed in the pier or from trucks. A
ship moored to a pier is more difficult to defend than one moored some distance
from shore, because of vehicle and pedestrian access. Also, host nations typically
prohibit visiting foreign military personnel from carrying weapons onto a pier.
The choice of Yemen, then, was an attempt to balance engagement priorities and
operational requirements with force-protection risks. The Crouch-Gehman
commission, however, summarized its concern about this balance at the
macropolicy level: “The execution of the engagement element of the National
Security Strategy lacks an effective, coordinated interagency process, which re-
sults in a fragmented engagement program that may not provide optimal sup-
port to in-transit units.”24
Intelligence
With respect to force-protection intelligence, Cole was on its own in many ways.
The formal report to Commander, Fifth Fleet required by the Navy’s Judge Advo-
cate General Manual (in service parlance, the “JAGMAN investigation” of this in-
cident) described the system as “putting the burden on the unit to ‘pull’
C A L L A W A Y 1 1 3
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information ‘down’ from various sources.”25 Other avenues of assistance were
missing. For example, the Navy Criminal Investigation Service provides
force-protection intelligence in foreign ports frequented by the Navy, but none
of its personnel were assigned to Yemen, and none traveled to meet the ship
there.26 In any case, human intelligence of the type that might have uncovered
the attempted attack on The Sullivans was lacking. The Crouch-Gehman Report
declares: “We, like other commissions before us, recommend the reprioritization of
resources for collection and analysis, including human intelligence and signal in-
telligence, against the terrorist.”27
From a strategic intelligence perspective, there had been ample warning but
no specific indications and no “actionable” intelligence. Some specific intelli-
gence was later alleged to have come out of the 1998 al-Qa‘ida bombings of the
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, but if so, either the Federal Bureau
of Investigation did not pass it on to the military or the warnings fell on deaf
ears. In any case, other warnings came from national foreign intelligence sources
in the summer of 2000. One was against a U.S. warship in Lebanon, but since the
Navy had no ships there and did not plan to send any, the threat became part of
the “chatter.”28 There was no specific intelligence that put Cole in danger of a
small-boat attack as it refueled in Yemen.
The Crouch-Gehman Report returned to the idea of a “seam,” this time re-
garding intelligence support. Apparently endorsing the JAGMAN investiga-
tion’s characterization of Cole as having had to “pull” relevant intelligence, the
Crouch-Gehman commission held that intelligence support should be “dedi-
cated from a higher echelon,” meaning that someone in the chain of command
(i.e., with more resources) above Cole should have provided better support to
the ship. The report went even farther and addressed specifically the tasking of
intelligence assets: “Intelligence production must be refocused and tailored to
overwatch transiting units to mitigate the terrorist threat.”29
Understanding the Threat
Between 1996, the year of the Khobar Towers bombing, and 2000, large-scale
terrorist attacks against American interests abroad continued, including the two
1998 East Africa embassy attacks. At the tactical level, antiterrorism and force
protection became a routine part of operational planning for military units. In
fact, Cole received accolades for the force-protection program it developed while
preparing for its departure in August 2000 for its deployment to the Mediterra-
nean and Middle East.30 These procedures were proven during four successful
port visits in the Mediterranean area on the way to Bahrain, in the Persian Gulf.
In the three days before the attack, the ship was focused on getting to its patrol
station. Cole navigated through the Suez Canal, which typically takes from
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twenty-four to thirty-six hours, then made a high-speed transit through the Red
Sea to Yemen, where it was to fuel and then head to Bahrain to take up its pri-
mary mission. This preoccupation is important in retrospect for three reasons.
First, the Navy facilities at Bahrain were recognized in April 2000 as having the
best force-protection program in the Department of Defense; it was reasonable
for the ship to assume accordingly that Bahrain was where the threat was acute.
No special arrangements had been made for Yemen, and no American official,
military or otherwise, came to meet the ship, not even the local defense attaché.
Second, Yemen was merely a brief stop for fuel, a necessary pause as Cole hurried
on the way to something more important. As the ship entered Yemen, the crew
was “not attuned to, or even aware of, the heightened threat level” (that is, of the
Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean).31 Third, transiting forces are considered rela-
tively secure. It is difficult for potential enemies to locate, let alone target, units
moving from one theater to another. Discerning all this, the Crouch-Gehman
Report focused on transiting forces and recommended that antiterrorism and
force protection be treated as one of a ship’s primary missions.32
PUTTING CHECKS IN THE BOXES
Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, in their book Military Misfortunes, argue that “ev-
ery war brings to the surface areas of warfare that . . . do not come under the pur-
view of preexisting military organization.” They define this tendency as a
“problem-organization mismatch.”33 Terrorism was clearly just such a challenge
to the U.S. military in the 1980s and 1990s. Cohen and Gooch argue further that
leadership must perceive and correct the problem-organization mismatch in or-
der to win.34 But the military did not perceive the problem-organization mis-
match arising from the terrorist threat until after Khobar Towers. The military’s
lack of progress in understanding the threat of terrorism from the Beirut bar-
racks in 1983 to Khobar Towers in 1996 was a “failure to learn,” by Cohen and
Gooch’s definition.35 In its summary of observations, the Long Commission
stated, “The most important message it can bring to the Secretary of Defense is
that the 23 October 1983 attack on the Marine Battalion Landing Team Head-
quarters in Beirut was tantamount to an act of war using the medium of terror-
ism.” That lesson, however, was not actually learned until after Khobar Towers,
thirteen years later.
The creation of the J-34 network in 1996 at the Joint Staff and subordinate
force-protection positions throughout the chain of command was an attempt to
align the organization with the problem. Unfortunately, organizational alignment
was neither uniform nor sufficient to prevent the Cole attack. The “J-34” designa-
tion itself denotes that on a joint staff, the antiterrorism/force-protection office
works in the current operations (J-3) branch. In the field, however, several
C A L L A W A Y 1 1 5
9
Callaway: Learning the Hard Way
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2009
echelons below at the carrier-strike-group level, CTF 50’s force-protection offi-
cer was designated “N20”—that is, a member of the staff intelligence branch
(N2).36 The intelligence branch naturally focused on threats to the strike group
in its operating area (the Persian Gulf, in this case), not on the potential threats
to small units steaming to join. The Fifth Fleet JAGMAN investigation deplored
CTF 50’s lack of oversight of the ship’s force-protection planning and execution,
particularly its tolerance of administrative errors and its generally hands-off ap-
proach.37 The Crouch-Gehman Report recommended several organizational
alignments to correct such deficiencies, including coordination between the
State Department and the combatant commanders, as well as dedicated intelli-
gence support from higher echelons for transiting units.38
Cohen and Gooch define a second category of failure, “failure to antici-
pate”—that is, “failure to take reasonable precautions against a known haz-
ard.”39 The military learned to take seriously terrorism against its facilities
abroad after Khobar Towers but failed to anticipate that the same threat might
be faced by transiting forces. The new J-34 force-protection organization had
brought attention to the issue but clearly not proficiency. The mea culpa for
this fault came in plain language, and it came from Secretary of Defense Wil-
liam Cohen himself:
All of us who had responsibility for force protection of USS Cole—including the Sec-
retary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman, the CNO, CINCCENT,
CINCLANTFLT, COMUSNAVCENT, and CTF-50, as well as the Commanding Offi-
cer of USS Cole—did not do enough to anticipate possible new threats.40
Failures at the Unit Level
Scott Snook, in Friendly Fire, an analysis of the accidental shooting-down of two
Army helicopters over northern Iraq, hypothesizes about general conditions
that increase the likelihood of mishaps. Complex organizations working in
stressful conditions over long periods of time are susceptible to something he
calls “practical drift”—a slow, steady uncoupling of local practice from written
procedure.41 Cole’s force-protection planning team had met before the previous
four port visits but did not meet before the brief stop for fuel in Aden. Its mem-
bers, having received no feedback on previous force-protection plans, modified
their CTF 50–approved Aden plan at their own discretion. More research is re-
quired to determine if the lack of attention to detail and of interaction with su-
periors displayed here was due to “practical drift,” but it is a plausible theory.
Admiral Harold W. Gehman (Retired), one of the co-chairs of the Defense
Department’s Cole investigation, offered an alternative theory in a speech at the
Naval Academy in 2005. In it he described an organizational defense mechanism
he called “trivialization”—diminishing the importance of something by endless
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layers of administration and nit-picking.42 “They had reduced the process down
to its lowest common denominator. I send off a message. I get an answer back.
Therefore, we are protected from terrorists.” Cole had put all the “checks in the
boxes,” but the force-protection training did not “sink in,” Admiral Gehman ar-
gued. “Our investigation found that they essentially had gone through the mo-
tions. In other words, they had determined the minimum that needed to be
done, and they had trivialized the whole event.”43
In the end, the Judge Advocate General Manual investigation concluded that
“USS Cole . . . had sufficient available information to make an accurate assess-
ment of the port Threat Levels and conditions in Aden, Yemen.” That is, the at-
tack was a failure at the tactical level. The Chief of Naval Operations disagreed.
He felt the attack could not have been prevented and the chain of command (in-
cluding himself) “did not equip the skipper for success in the environment he
encountered in Aden Harbor that fateful day.”44 The secretary of defense
concurred.
The Inevitability of Surprise
Richard Posner’s book Preventing Surprise Attacks is a critical review of the 9/11
Commission report. It compares with September 11th the surprise attack at
Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Tet Offensive in 1968, and the Yom Kippur War of
1973.45 Posner “suggests that [some] surprise attacks cannot reliably be pre-
vented” but that some can be prevented, deterred, or mitigated in their effects.
Figure 3 summarizes the common features Posner found in the four events he
reviewed and compares them with the Cole attack.
While little evidence suggests that the Cole attack was preventable, this possi-
bility should not be ruled out. As noted in figure 3, no warning signs were ob-
served, but that does not mean they were not present. Human-intelligence
resources were not in place to unearth traces of the attempted attack on The Sul-
livans, and apparently no countersurveillance assets were in place to observe any
“dry runs” the attackers may have made during succeeding fueling stops by
American warships. The guided-missile frigate USS Hawes (FFG 53) and the
guided-missile destroyers USS Donald Cook (DDG 75) and USS Barry (DDG
52) all refueled in Aden Harbor between The Sullivans and Cole.46 But as the
Crouch-Gehman Report holds, counterintelligence programs are “integral to
force protection.”47 Without assets ashore, there was a definite gap in
counterintelligence coverage however vigilant the visiting ships were in obser-
vation and diligent in reporting.
Lastly, Cole failed to make itself a “hard target.”The intent of the force-protection
measures directed for Cole was to provide greater security, of course, but also to
demonstrate “resolve” to potentially hostile elements watching the ship or moving
C A L L A W A Y 1 1 7
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in to attack. The primary failure of Cole, as noted by the Judge Advocate General
Manual investigation and endorsed by the Chief of Naval Operations, was the fail-
ure to screen approaching boats, whether with the assistance of the host-nation mil-
itary, services contracted through the husbanding agent, or the ship’s own boats. As
previously mentioned, the JAGMAN investigation and the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions disagreed on the issue of whom to hold accountable for this failure.
It is nearly impossible to discern a single, definitive answer as to what made
Cole susceptible to a terrorist attack that day. There was organizational failure,
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Strategic factors:
• The attacker was too weak to have a reasonable hope of success
conventionally.
° Al-Qa‘ida is a nonstate actor and lacks conventional forces.
• The victim’s perception of the enemy’s weakness contributed to his
vulnerability.
° A brief stop for fuel at a dolphin in daylight.
• The victim lacked understanding of capabilities and intentions.
° “A waterborne suicide attack had not been considered likely.”a
• The victim was in a state of denial regarding the forms of attack hardest to
defend against.
° “We failed to anticipate what appeared to be the improbable or
weakest link in the chain.”b
• Intelligence officers were reluctant to challenge superior’s opinion for
career reasons.
° An intelligence official resigned in protest the day after the attack.c
Tactical factors:
• The victim reasonably thought the principal danger was elsewhere or in
the future.
° Cole’s primary mission was in the Persian Gulf.
• The victim was lulled by false alarms or deliberate deceptions.
° Nonspecific warning information was available in numbing quantity.
• Warnings to local commanders lacked clarity and credibility.
° There was confusion about the applicable threat level in Yemen.d
Posner’s common feature missing from the Cole attack:
• Warning signs were interpreted based on the mirror-imaged assumption.
° There were no observed warning signs.
FIGURE 3
COMPARISON OF USS COLE ATTACK TO SELECTED SURPRISE ATTACKS
a. HASC, executive summary, p. ii.
b. HASC, p. 39, General Hugh Shelton testimony.
c. John Diamond, “Red Flags Raised before Cole Bombing Warning Lacked Specific Details, Pentagon Says,” Chicago Tribune, 26
October 2000.
d. JAGMAN investigation, p. 103. For more detail see also pp. 20–23.
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by which the ship was left without the appropriate support of higher headquar-
ters. There were also small but important procedural and tactical errors by the
commanding officer and his crew. Without a doubt, Snook’s “practical drift”
and Gehman’s “trivialization” also played some role. Finally, the commonalities
Posner finds among surprise attacks fit the Cole situation like a glove.
A SHIFT TO THE OFFENSIVE
In order to assess the military’s learning about force protection, this article has
examined the findings of the investigations conducted after the terrorist attacks
on the Beirut barracks in 1983, Khobar Towers in 1996, and Cole in 2000. Figure
4 updates the schematic of figure 1 to reflect the “learning curves” in command
and control, intelligence, and threat definition over the seventeen-year period
between the first attack studied and that on Cole.
Faced in 2000 with another failure in force protection, the military as an orga-
nization raised the priority of the terrorist threat. The Crouch-Gehman Report
recommended, as noted, that antiterrorism/force-protection efforts be given
equal weight with a unit’s primary mission. In other words, force-protection
training and equipment need to be on par with those devoted to traditional
Navy missions like antisubmarine warfare, air defense, and strike warfare.48 This
prioritization has proved necessary to provide a self-defense capability for Navy
units against the terrorist threat as they carry out missions around the globe.
The military today is organizationally aligned with the problem, and force pro-
tection is prioritized as a primary mission—lesson learned.
Intelligence critiques of the three attacks decry the lack of human intelli-
gence. More precisely, no available HUMINT assets were apparently tasked





















terrorism Accident War War
FIGURE 4
MILITARY LEARNING 1983/1996/2000 TERRORIST ATTACKS
a. AT/FP = antiterrorism/force protection.
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according to the potential threat. The practical effect of this “failure to antici-
pate” was a gap in collection and analysis. A less obvious lesson, specifically from
the Cole case, is the need for systematic counterintelligence at the unit level. Cur-
rently, unit-level training includes a robust countersurveillance capability, but
more work needs to be done to determine how that might be improved. An ef-
fective counterintelligence program at the unit level closely knitted to a local
human-intelligence capability focusing on the terrorist threat should be a goal
of the force-protection program. Whether this lesson was truly learned is diffi-
cult to assess and may not be known (and then only in the negative sense) at
the unclassified level unless there is another successful attack.
Finally, if the blood of the 277 service members killed in the three attacks
studied in this article did not drive home the true nature of the terrorist threat to
the armed forces, the attacks of 11 September 2001 surely did. The military’s or-
ganizational understanding of the threat matured, its force-protection efforts
redoubled, and its stance became proactive. The shift to the offensive marked by
Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM signaled an end to the re-
active posture of the pre–September 11th military.
Continued review of terrorist attacks against U.S. military forces may yield
further lessons that if learned may improve the current program of deterrence,
mitigation, and response. Force protection requires deeper investigation and re-
flection by commanders to ensure that the hard-won lessons of the last
twenty-five years remain fresh during the current wars and beyond.
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